First Circuit
Case: United States v. Tkhilaishvili, No. 18-1027, 2019 WL 2366361, at *2 (1st Cir. June 5, 2019)
Type of Case: Criminal
Charges/Counts: Conspiring and attempting to commit Hobbs Act extortion (counts 1 and 2), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
Rule(s) of Evidence Cited
- FRE 404(b)
Holding: The First Circuit upheld the district court’s admission of evidence of the defendants’ prior violent acts.
By way of background, the defendants were charged with extorting the victim by threatening to harm his property or his family if he didn’t give up a portion of an ownership interest in a business. At trial, the government sought to offer evidence that another person had told the victim of the defendants’ prior violent acts. The defendants argued that the district court should have excluded references to those other violent acts.
The First Circuit disagreed, holding that the prior acts were relevant to the defendants’ intent. The Court wrote:
“As the court below concluded, the evidence of prior violent acts was specially relevant to the defendants’ intent to threaten [the victim]. After all, ‘whether a defendant has attempted to induce fear in a victim depends only in part on what the defendant has said or done to the victim. It also depends on what the defendant thinks or reasonably should think the victim independently believes about the context in which both are operating.’ United States v. Goodoak, 836 F.2d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1988). Where, as here, the defendants had reason to believe that [the victim] would have learned of their prior violent acts, they could rely on him ‘to put two and two together and to feel afraid.’ Id. Thus, the disputed evidence was relevant to a determination concerning what the defendants likely thought [the victim] believed about the context in which all three operated. It follows that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that evidence of the defendants’ prior violent acts was specially relevant to the jury’s assessment of the defendants’ intent.
If more were needed — and we doubt that it is — evidence that [the victim] had been told about the defendants’ prior violent acts was also specially relevant to show [the victim’s] state of mind, including his reasonable belief in the defendants’ threats of violence. See Iwuala, 789 F.3d at 6. Where the question is whether the defendants’ ‘words and acts amounted to an attempt to induce fear, the jury is surely entitled to know whether those words and acts did in fact induce fear.’ Goodoak, 836 F.2d at 712. Similarly, evidence concerning the victim’s reasonable beliefs about the context in which he and his putative extorter are operating is relevant to show the victim’s state of mind. See id. at 713.”
